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Geertz, Melson and Wolpe, Huntington and others have argued that mo-
dernization promotes potentially disintegrative forces in developing areas, and, 
in particular, often gives rise to powerful ethnic groupings. 1 In this article, 
we elaborate this hypothesis in the context of the developing nations of black 
Africa. In so doing, we also attempt to demonstrate the relevance and useful-
ness to political scientists of the extensive work on modernization in Africa 
produced by students of related disciplines, and fo draw from these studies 
evidence for our principal assertion: that in conterriporary Africa, moderniza-
tion and ethnic competition can and do covary. 
The first part of the paper is definitional: we clarify our usage of the major 
terms of our argument. The second part is evidential: drawing on the social sci-
ence .literature from Africa, we attempt to demonstrate that the goods of modernity 
are desired but scarce; that modern ization therefore creates new patterns of stra-
tification; and that both these phenomena engender patterns of ethnic competition 
in Africa. We then move to our basic problem of explanation. Given that moderni-
zation promotes competition, why is it- that this competition assumes ethnic form? 
[n seeking answers to this question, we devote two sections of the paper to 
the formation and persiste nce of ethnic groupings. In the last section of the 
paper, we move to the task of specification. "\Ve argue that ethnic competition 
can be present in varying degrees, culminating in ethnic violence; and we seek 
to specify the circumstances under which the different intensities of competition 
may emerge. 
II 
The m ajor terms of our argument are modernity, modernization, ethnic 
competition, and ethnic group. 
In keeping with conventional usage, we define modernity operationally and 
call those nations more modern which attain higher levels on the following vari-
ables: education, per capita income, urbanization, political participation, indus-
trial employment, and media participation. In practice, we will restrict our at­
tention to the first three of these variables. We feel justified in using a single 
term- "modernity--to refer to these distinct variables, for it has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that they are highly interrelated and that their interrelation derives 
from their tapping a single underlying dimension. 2 
Modernization we define as the process of attaining modernity. While moder­
nity may be a highly interrelated and coherent set of variables- -a system, as 
Lerner states - -modernization is an incremental process. It takes the form of 
successive attempts to maximize the specific variables that comprise modernity. 
From the point of view of those who are modernizing, modernization is. represented 
by the striving for more plentiful and better paying jobs, the search for urban 
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employment, the creation of fellowships for more education, the issuance of 
trading iicenses, and the quest for a host of other immediate benefits. 
By ethnic com.petition, we tr).ean the striving by ethnic groups for 
valued goods which are scarce in comparison to the demand for them. Ollr 
definition of an ethnic group is, perforce, complex. In using the term, we 
refer to a set of people who organize common activities, be they social 
(e. g. age-grade initiations), economic (e.g. cattle herding), or political 
(e.g. organizing behind a common candidate); who have the conviction that 
they share common interests_ and a common fate; and who have d evised a 
cultural symbolism expressing their cohesiveness as a group. One factor 
that distinguishes ethnic groups is the cultural symbolism which they employ: 
it is characterized by collective myths of origin; the assertion of ties of 
kinship or blood, be they real or putative; a mytho.logy expressive of the 
cultural uniqueness or superiority of the group; or a conscious elaboration of 
its la�guage and heritage. Ethnic g:r;oups also differ from olher groups in 
their composi tiort: they include pers.ons from every stage of life and every 
socio-economic level. 31 
It is important to note that ethnic groups need not 
be tribes. By our usage, the term tribe denotes a group bound by traditional 
political structures, to which people are linked by the mechanisms of 
tradi tional political obligation. Ethnic groups need not be based on traditional 
political institutions; rather, many are based upon newly created political. 
organizations, forged 'in the competitive environment of the modern era. 
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Moreover, the boundaries of ethnic groups may not be dictated by the tradition at 
all. Rather, ethnic groups are dynamic groups which use and redefine tradition in 
a manner dictated by contemporary necessities; thus, persons from separate tribes 
may in the modern era be allied with a single ethnic coalition, and the history of their 
past relations be reinterpreted to support the alliance. 
m 
Modernity is a cluster of desired goods. This· is not to state 
that it ·is uncritically accepted, nor that African people do not beery the 
obvious costs of modernization. The development of such philosophies 
as Negritude, Humanism, and the multitidinous versions of African 
Socialism by African intellectuals, and the spread of urban prophet 
churches and anti-v,.itchcraft movements among some of the African 
masses, suggests the sensitivity of many to the costs of modernization. 4 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the components of modernity are strongly 
desired, 
The desire for modernity: The widespread demand of Africans for 
education has been amply documented; the promise of universal primary 
education is a political necessity in most African states. 5 Africans have 
demonstrated a willingness to alter life-styles and social structures in 
pursuit of higher incomes. For example, Sctidder and Colson have documented 
the transition of one isolated and impoverished community, the Gwembe 
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Tonga of Zambia,. through three major agricultural sys tems; the agri-
cul tural transition of the Kipsigis and Kikuyu are well known; 7 so too is the 
5 
wholesale adoption of new cash crops by the Baganda. In a discussion of the 
most reno\V�'3d <leYiant case, the 1viasai.., Gulliver persuasivel)' argues that 
their "backward" behavior is consistent with income maximization. The 
economic benefits of modernity are not rejected, he contends; rather, 
they simply are not certain enough. to warrant the potential ·costs of 
8 
change. Studies of the flows of labor migrants in Africa also document 
our point. The overwhelming consensus of students of this phenomenon 
is that the cause of these migrations is the desire for employment and 
the income it makes possible. As stated by Gulli;,..er: "the incentives to 
labor migrants.are primarily and preeminently a desire for cash and 
material wealth which are not available at ho�e. II 
9 
The desire for modernity is also· evidenced in the rapid 
expansion· of urban areas in Africa. · The rate of expansion is truly. 
impressive. According to available figures, the least rapidly urbanizing 
state in Africa, Gambia, nonetheless experienced a 142o/o increase in its 
urban population between 195 5-19 6 5 ,  an increase of at least three times 
its rate of population growth. For the most rapidly urbanizing nation, 
Malawi, the rate of increase was 617% over the same time period. 
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Of all the modernizing trends in Africa, the growth of the cities has 
perhaps been the most extensively studied, While most studies report 
that the influx of urban migrants represents a search for higher incomes, 
recently collected materials lend greater credence to a popular hypothesis 
that l:tas often been denigrated by scholars of the phenomenon: that 
6 
urbanization also represents a que s t  for the modern s tyle of life which 
11 
money can buy. 
Competition for modernity: The desire fol" the components of modernity 
in Africa is thus fully as incontrovertable as are the dissatisfactions to 
which modernity gives rise. Modernity is valued; equally as important, 
the goods it represents are scarce in proportion to the demand for them. 
The inevitable result is that people compete for these goods and for control 
over the agencies. which promote and direct the process of moderniz ation . 
This competition is best illustrated in the competition for income 
and for several of the resources which create wealth: land, markets, and 
jobs. In the agricultural societies of Africa, part icularly where the 
population is dense, the penetration of a money econor:iy gives rise to an 
intense competition for land. As Colson states: "By themselves such 
changes had an impact on local systems of land rights as men began to 
evaluate the land . they used in new ways. They also led to an increasing 
number of legal ba ttles over land; for men were encouraged to establish 
long-term rights in particular holdings either for immediate use or for 
subsequent gain. 1112 While much of the compe tition for land is intra-ethnic, 
much of it is inter-ethnic as well. Polly Hill has published accounts of ' 
several major inter-ethnic land disputes in Ghana. 13 The dispute between 
the Kikuyu and Masai over control of the former white highlands has created 
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a major cleavage in the political life of Kenya. And a major source of 
urban conflict is the te n sion between tho s e  ind igeno us ethnic groups who 
7 
have alientate their lands and those immigrant groups who have be nefited
from the occupation of urban real es ta te. 15 
The competition for control of trade is equally intense, One 
of the best analyses of this phenomenon is by Abner Cohen who documents 
the intensive riva,lry between the Yoruba and Hausa for control over .fir st 
the Kola trade and then the long distance trade in cattle in Nigeria. 
G. I. Jones describes the 19th Century competition for control over trading 
routes to the interior along the Southern Coast of Nigeria. and P. C. 
Lloyd documents the rivalry between Itsekiri and Urhobo for marketing 
f "lit· · ·w 16 s h · aci ies in arri. uc conflicts characterize Eastern Africa 
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as well. One need only note the pervasive rivalry between blacks and 
Asians for control over commerce; specific instances of competition, 
as between Bagandan and Indian traders in Kampala and Luo and Asian 
shopkeepers in Kisumu1 have been well documented, as have. the 
consequences for the emergence of ethnic groupings. 23 
Equally as pervasive is the competition for jobs. Parkin 
discusses the rivalry between Luo and Baganda for employment in the 
industrial and service sectors of Kampala; Grillo, in his analysis of 
the East African Railways, notes a similar rivalry between Luo and 
18 Abaluhya. Competition for urban employment has been noted between 
the Bamil€keand Douala in the Cameroons; between Nyanja and Bemba 
speakers on the copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia; between indigenous 
Africans and strangers in Abidjan; and between Kasai Baluba and Bena 
8 
L 1 . K . . . h C 19 b . h . h u ua in asa1 province ln t e ongo. Exacer at1ng t ese tensions as 
been the expansion of the production of educated employables at a rate 
in excess of the expansion of job opportunities, a phenomenon that has 
been extensively studied in Ghana, Nigeria, and elsewhere. 20 
Modernity and stratification: Not only does modernization thus create 
competition. But also, because the elements of modernity are valued 
and scarce, they form the basis of a new stratification system in Africa. 
This is not to state that traditional criteria of social ranking are totally 
relinquished; indeed, all evidence is to the contrary, and we shall argue 
that the interplay between the two stratification systems is crucially 
significant in explaining the emergence of ethnic groups in the modern era • .
Nonetheless, those who are educated, w ealthy, and dwell in cities, and who 
possess the power derived from competence in the modern sector, can 
successfully claim higher social rank in contemporary African society 
than those who lack these attributes. 
The creation of a new stratification systems is documented in 
studies of occupational prestige in Africa. These studies find that 
modern roles, such as those _of the teacher or clerk, are given high 
prestige and that in fact they are generally ranked higher than the roles 
of·traditional societies, such as those of craftsman or hunter. The 
results of these studies go beyond suggesting that modern occupations 
are prestigeful, however, !<:i_ emphasising that modern conceptions 
9 
of st::-c. ti£ication are being utilized by African peop_les. Thus, several 
studies report a close correspondence between the ranking of occupations 
by Europeans and Africans; Foster, for example, finds a correlation 
of+. 88 between the prestige rankings of occupations by Ghanaian and 
American samples, while Hicks reports a correlation of+. 80 between 
21 
the rankings of occupations by African and white pupils in Zambia. 
Xydias reports occupational rankings by Africans in the Congo which 
correspond closely to those produced in the more developed countries. 
And Fricks, in another study of occupational prestige in Zambia, finds 
22 
the criteria for the rankings to b e  similar to those :reported in industrial-
ized societies. The prestige of an occupation can largely be accounted for, 
he indicates, by the degree of responsibility, service value, income, 
23 education , and the nature of the working conditions associated with it. 
The nurr£:rous studies of elite formation in Africa also suggest 
that those who possess the attributes of modernity can successfully lay 
claim to high status in _many indigenous societies. This has been amply 
documented ·in the primarily agricultural societies of West Africa. Thus, 
Lloyd, in a series of artides notes the rise of wealthy traders and 
educated clerical workers as a new elite in Yoruba society; Austin discusses 
the same phenomenon among the Ashanti and, like Lloyd, documents the 
24 conflicts between the new elite and the traditional ruling classes. The 
sarne pattern appears in the agricultural societies of East Africa as well. 
iO 
Studies of the Gisu, Chagga, Luo and Abaluhya report how the spread 
of education and cash cropping generated new groups of literates and 
wealthy traders and how these new segments of the population successfully 
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lay claim t o  elite status. I n  the urban areas, too, education, wealth 
and an occupation in the modern sector, be it administrative or industriai, 
represent entitlements to elite status; this is documented for Ibadan, 
Kisangani, Kinshasa, and Jos at the very least. 2 6
Stratification and competition: Crucial to the emergence of ethnic 
competition is that societies as well as individuals tend to be evaluated 
along the dimension of modernity. Those groups which are more wealthy, 
better educated, and more urbanized tend to be envied, resented, and 
sometimes feared by others; and the basis for these sentiments is the 
recognition of their superior position in the new system of stratification. 
Thus, for example, in Calabar, the indigenous Efik took readily to 
education, while the immigrant Ibo lacked both education and the wealth 
which would follow; the result was tension and hostility, senti�ents which 
27 
were exacerbated by the Ibo's attempts to close the gap. This case 
finds its parallel in the famed rivalry between the Ibo and Yoruba. 
Exposed to education at an earlier date, prosperous because of cocoa, and 
the indigenous people of the urban areas which became the prima ry locus 
of administrative and industrial development, the Yoruba claimed top 
rank in the modern society of Nigeria. The envy of the Ibo, and the 
tensions which resulted from their attempts to catch up with the Yoruba, 
are too well known to warrant detailed discussion here. So too with 
the northern peo?les of Nigeria; their fear of the superiority of the 
southern peoples in the modern sector led them to an explicit policy 
of "northernization" whereby they gave privileged access to educational 
and employment opportunities to residents of the north. Their unequal 
status in modern society led another point of conflict with the southerners, 
this time over the date of self-government in Nigeria. As related for the 
Birom: "Birom leaders expressed unease at the thought of rapid achievement 
of selfgovernment-0-in fact at the idea of self government before the B irom 
have produced enough professional men and traders and artisans to be 
28 
able to claim all the occupations of control which exist in their division. 11 
As a result, the Birom aligned with the Northern Peoples Congress instead 
of with one of the several southern parties which were competing for their 
ailegiance, for the Congress favored a later date for self-government. 
'.the pattern of rivalry for equality along the modern dimension 
finds its parallel in the competition between the Itsekiri and Urhobo in 
Warri; the Ijebu and Ibandan Yoruba in Ibadan; the Bakongo and B angala 
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i n  Leopoldville; and the Baluba and· Bena Lulua i n  Kasai. . The p attern 
of political alignments is paralleled throughout Africa.· Thus, for 
example, the less develcpedpastoralists less fervently pressed for s elf-
government in Kenya than did the agriculturalists; and when they saw 
that their efforts were to fail, they sought to fragment power through a 
12 
federal constitution. The pastorali sts feared the perpetuation of the 
disparity between themselves and the more educated, urbanized, and 
wealthy agriculturalists which would result were Kenya to become 
independent under the political control of the agriculturalist tirbes. 
This conflict was perhaps the major basis for the split between KANU 
30 and KADU in Kenya. The political alignments in West African politics, 
such as in t he Cameroons, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, are 
amenable to similar treatment. In these cases too party conflict tended 
to parallel the split between the more modernized residents, generally 
in the coastal areas, and the less :rn:X!ernized. peoples, generally dwelling 
31 in the hinterlands. Similarly in Uganda, where the UPC represented 
a coalition of less modernized ethnic groups in common opposition to 
32 the prospects of a Baganda hegemony. As Zolberg succintly states:
"Many [of the changes introduced under colonial rule] have reinforced 
old differntiations between· tribes by adding to them new ones based on 
modern attributes, such as wealth and education. 11 33 "On the whole 
political activity has mirrored ethnic antagonisms that continue to prevail 
34 between groups. 11 And as one Nigerian commentator states: 
T ribalism, then, exists when members of tribal groups must 
compete as groups for places in the class, status and power 
systems of the new nation. In a manner of speaking ... it 
is a form of social indecision regarding the strategy of equitable 
distribution of . . . advantages available to people in the new 
African nations. 3S 
l3 
The political conflicts associated with the competition for modernity 
are intensified by the desire of ethnic groups to establish congruence 
between the£r "modernity status" and the political status positions. 36 The goods of 
modernity are scarce,and as a result the less modernized persons tend to 
.be in the majority. Put another way, there is a disparity between modernity 
status -- as measured by education, income, and urban dwelling -- and 
political power -- as determined by numbers. The result of this disparity 
is a feverish attempt by the leaders of the less m.odernized peoples to 
convert their majority position into political control over the allocation of 
modern r esources and thereby enhance their position in the modern s ector. 
A second result is the fear of the loss of power by the more modernized 
peoples. The consequence is strain and tension, as the majority converts 
37 numbers into power and power into the attainment of modern benefits. 
As studies of Zanzibar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Nigeria indicate, this process 
of attempted restratification can rapidly lead to violence. 38 
IV 
The basic question that arises from this discussion.is: Why 
should the competition for the components of modernity and for status 
positions as defined by modernity involve ethnic groups at all? At 
least two answers can be given to this question. The first is that 
both the distribution of modernity and ethnic groups tends to be governed 
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by the factor of space. \![here modernization takes place often largely 
determines who gets modernized. The second is that it is often useful 
for those engaged in the competition for modernity to generate and 
mobilize the support of ethnic groupings. 
The factor of space: It i.s the geographers who most forcefully portray the spati.al 
patterns of modernization. Originating in "nodes" or "central places, 11 
modernity then spreads or "diffuses" into the more remote regions of 
the territory, they report. They also demonstrate that the level of 
modernity slopes downward with distance, with the central places being 
the most modernized, the proximate areas being the next most developed, 
39 and the hinterlands lagging behind. While there is considerable debate 
over whether territoriality is a required component of the definition of 
an ethnic group, there is no denying that the members of an ethnic group 
tend to cluster in space; nor can it be questioned but that colonial policy 
made every attempt to assign ethnic groups to stable and rigidly define.d 
areas. The result of this correspondence in spatial orderings is that 
those ethnic groups which are most proximate to the locus of the impact 
of modernity tend to be the most modernized; and thus the competition for 
the benefits of modernity and for status positions in the modern sector 
can become organized on ethnic lines. 
The evidence for this asserti.on is persuasive. Soja, in his 
anal�'sis of modernization in Kenya, finds that the Kikuyu, being proximate 
15 
t o  Nair obi and the highlands, are the n1ost urbanized and educated, and 
among the more wealtl':)· o.f the ethnic gr oups in Kenya.40 Similarly, 
Coleman and Abernethy argue that the initial advantage of the Yoruba 
in Nigeria derived from their proximity to Lagos and from the early 
establishment of missions in Lagos and Abeokuta. The Ibo, being more remote 
from these areas,were initially less exposed to the centers of modernization; 
and being less proximate to the locus of mission activity, they lagged 
. f d . d 11
·
. " b  41 Th badly in the attainment o e ucation an we -paying JO s. e 
preeminence of the Baganda, as well as the tensions which have resulted, 
have also been 
.explained in terms of their proximity to the administrative 
capital and largest tov..rn in Uganda. As one analyst reports: 
in Uganda (with the possible exception of the southeastern area) 
geographical distance from the capital city is sufficient to provide 
a rough indicator of the degree of modernity. Most Ugandans are 
fully aware that the Baganda profited more than others from their 
close proximity to the administrative center of the country. 42 
So pervasive a phenomenon does this appear· that spatial proximity is 
sometimes offered as an alternative to classic notions of "cultural 
receptivity" in e:>..-plaining differing rates of change. Thus, Kasfir, 
discussing Apter's structural-cultural theory of modernization in Buganda, 
notes that given the proximity of the Baganda to Kampala, the "argument 
. cannot be proved or disproved . JI 43 And Gugler, in d iscussing 
the general resistance of pastoralists to the forces of change, comments 
that "the underlying more general factor [is] probably that many of these 
44 are difficult of access to schools and administration alike. JI 
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Space, administration, and the incentive to organize: We have n oted that 
c ol onial p o lic y, .and in particular indir ect rule, ensured t he cor respon den ce 
between l evels of m odernity and ethnic me mb�rship, primarily by 
reinforcing the permanency of the spatial boundaries of ethnic groups. 
Colonial policy had anotrer effect: it furnished an incen tive to the formation 
of ethnic organizations. The local administration, whatever its faults, 
served as one of the primary agents of modernization in Africa. And the 
colonial powers, by delineating administrative boundaries along "tribal" 
lines, made it in the interests of their subjects to organize ethnic groupings 
so as to gain control over the administrative me c hanis ms which themselves 
controlled the process of modernization. 
This assertion is best demonstrated in the studies of one of the
 primary 
source of income .in Africa, land. Colson notes that colonial poli
cy 
produced two contradictory developments in land law. On the one hand, 
the growth of the cash economy furnished an incentive for individual 
ownership; on the other, the dominant mythology of the colonial adm
inis­
tration, that land was "communally owned, 11 restricted permanent r
ights 
46 . r t' to land to the members of the local ethnic group. A clear imp ica ion 
of Colson's analysis is that as the benefits of land ownership increase
d, 
as they did '\Vith the spread of cash cropping, so did the importance of 
retaining and affirming membership in ethnic gr oups. The political 
consequences of this rapidly became evident in the conduct of the local 
councils in which jurisdiction over land rights had in part been vested
. 
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The local coun!Cils began to function as ethnic organizations, legi s la ti ng 
so a_s t o  protect the benefits brought t o  the local population by the 
modernization process. Thus, Coleman reports that with the apprec ia tion 
of land values, councils in Owerri, Ibadan, Benin, Idoma, Tiv, and 
!gala in Nigeria restricted access to land to the local ethnic group and 
divested strangers of the rights of permanent tenure. In this way, the 
m aterial benefits to be derived from the land were channeled to the local 
46
residents and indigenous ethnic group. · 
The power of the local administration over economic resources 
extended beyond the control of land tenure to such other matters as access 
to markets and market stalls, the regulation of crop production and animal 
husbandry, the construction of roads for the export of produce, and etc. 
At the behest of those who had the greatest stake in the modern economy, 
often organized in "improvement unions," many councils acted so as to 
bias the distribution of these resources for the benefit of the local population 
and away from immigrant strangers. Thus, La Fontaine reports that 
local leaders sought to distribute roads and payments to coffee growers 
around Mbale so as to benefit Gisu cash croppers exclusively. Lonsdale 
documents the attempts by the I<;avirondo local councils to restrict access 
to markets to Abaluhya and Luo merchants and to alter agricultural 
regulations for the benefit of Abaluhya and Luo cash croppers; both actions 
were in opposition to Asians and Europeans. And Lloyd, in his discussion 
of Urhobo and Itsekiri rivalry in municipal elections in Warri, notes that 
18 
"It was said during the 19 5 5  election campaigns that whichever tribe won 
the election would restrict the lease of stalls to its own members and 
thus give them a monopoly of the trade in the town. 114 7 
Given the power of the local administration over the distribution 
of the benefits of modernity, and given the correspondence between 
administrative and ethnic boundaries, it was therefore natural that those 
who sought to modernize would create politically cohesive ethnic groupings. 
The demand of ethnic groups for their own districts and councils represents 
the logical culnrination of this process, for by securing this demand they 
can more perfectly ensure the diversion of the benefits of modernity to the 
members of their own group. 
The behavior of the moderns: A second reason for the formation of ethnic 
g roups is that in the competition for the benefits of modernity, it has been in 
the interests of the most modern elements to sponsor the growth of 
"t d" t" 111 • • Af . 48 h ra t tona consciousness tn rtca. T at the modern elements took 
the initiative in organizing "tra-ditional" groupings is. extensively documented 
in the literature . 
The 11educateds11 often were the founders of ethnic unions. Thus, 
Lonsdale speaks of "the Christian establishment" of missio;,-trained literates 
who helped to form the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association. Twaddle 
writes of the '"new men' created by missionary education" who helped to form 
the Young Bagwere Association. And the role of the former mission students in 
organizing the independent schools among the Kiku�·u and promoting ethnic 
19 
consciousness in that tribe has been discussed by many authors. 49 In 
terms of income, it is often those who are better-off by dint of their 
occupations in the modern sector--the clerks, cash croppers, and 
traders--who form ethnic unions. Thus, for example, Ottenberg notes 
that it was those who "work as clerks for the local British Administration, 
who teach in local schools, who work for traders, or who are traders 
themselve s "  who founded ethnic unions among the Afikpo Ibo. 
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Sklar 
notes that both the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and Ibo State Union "were created 
by representatives of the new and rising class--lawyers, doctors, 
51 
businessmen, civil servants . . . II And George Ben nett notes that 
the Bahaya Union was led largely by relatively prosperous cash croppers 
and members of cooperative societies whose economic interests were 
threatened by the government's policies toward coffee cultivation and land 
52 
management. 
The role of urban dwelle:i; s in the formatiort of ethnic unions 
stands out most clearly in the literature from West Africa. There, ethnic 
unions were most often formed in urban centers and only later exported 
to the ru.ral areas whose names they often bore. As !!tated by Offodile: 
"It is significant to o
.
bserve that almost all the tribal �nions now existing 
in.Nigeria were found, not in the very towns of the tribes represented, 
but outside their own villages, and sometimes outside their own tribal 
J..O 
territories . . . 
53 " Thus, it was in Lagos where the Ibo came into 
competition with the Yoruba and where Ibo tribal consciousness was 
formed. It was in Leopoldville that Abako was founded; only later was 
it exported to the majority of the Bakongo in the surrounding rural 
54 
territories. And even in the case .of such minor tribal unions as the 
Afikpo Town Welfare Association, the origin of the organization lay in 
the city: "An educated Afikpo man working at a trade-union·.p�st in Aba, 
who had travelled widely in the course of his work . . .  realized the need 
for a protective union to aid Afikpo people . . . . ,At hi s own expense 
he had 400 membership cards printed to organize Afikpo people . .  : . 1155 
There were numerous motivations for the formation of these 
unions but one stands out: the perception by the moderns that they must 
organize collective support to advance their position in the compe tition for 
the benefits of modernity, something to which we now turn. 
Competition and ethnic consolidation: We have noted that there are 
good reasons for one ethnic group to be more advanced than another; in 
part, the spatial diffusion of modernization makes this inevitable. We 
have also noted the forces that can account for an ethnic group consolidating 
itself into a position of advantage. For one, because modernity creates 
status differentiation, the members of an advantaged ethnic group are 
motivated to defend their leading position; they devise methods for retaining 
their privileged pos itions , such as by biasing local council legislation in the
. 
ways we have described. Secondly , because modernity is desired, the less 
21 
favored members 0£ an c:thnic group place immense pressure on their 
more advantaged brothers to share the benefits derived from their 
advanced positions. Thus, family loyalties are act1'vated to · 
56 
secure JObs; 
the income of the more prosperous is claimed by kin, often to meet 
school fees that will in turn secure future prosperity;
57 
and urban dwellers 
find their households being used by co.untry folk in h f searc o urban employ-
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ment. Under the pressure of the less advantaged, a sense of obligation 
us roa e?ed to resemblin. 
g that usually extended to immediate kin is th b d 
include fellow village dwellers and even persons from other villages and 
districts;. and the language of relationships, such as the use of putative 
kin terms, is broadened to suggest this expansion. The result of these 
pressures is that the more advantaged members of the group are forced 
to draw into their sphere others of their kind : And the social climbing 
less advantaged generate a mythology of consanguity in search of modern 
benefits. The initially advantaged group thus consolidate� itself in the 
modern sector and comes to view itself as an ethnic grouping in the process. 
The result of this process of consolidation is to create a1nong 
the men1bers of other groups a sense of threat and disadvantaae 0 • 
the competition for jobs, it is the more modern elements of these 
In 
groups 
who m ost directly experience this threat and perceive it in ethnic terms. 
They come to understand that they are placed at a d isadvantagc by their 
inability to activate the sense of ethnic obli'gati'on so as to gain access 
to the modern sector. Moreover, they perceive that their individual 
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progress is closely determined by .the collective standing of their group; 
they therefore initiate programs of collective advancement in response. 
The creation of ethnic support by the competitors for jobs has 
been noted by Grillo in his analysis of the Railway African Union in 
Uganda. High office in the Union often led to promotion to more advanced 
jobs in the railway company, and so was much desired by railway employees. 
In order to enhance their mobility prospects by gaining union office, 
candidates would sometimes make appeals to tribal loyalty. As stated 
by Grillo, "Although those seeking office . . .  may have little sense .?f 
tribal interest, tribalism may be one of the weapons used in the struggle 
1159 A similar pattern has been noted in Kenya, where accusations 
are made regarding the "Kikuyuization" of the government services and 
ethnic pressures mounted by the leaders of the les·s advanced groups in 
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protest over job discrimination. However, the most striking illustration 
of the creation of ethnic action is to be found in West Africa. Perceiving 
that their individual fate in the struggle for modernity was tied to the 
collective s tanding of people from their own areas , the most modern 
members of the less rrodernized groups organized large scale programs 
of advancement among their people. David Abernethy furnished the best 
discussion of the phenomenon: 
The struggle for employment was bound to produce frustration, 
and those not chosen for the best jobs found it easy to blame 
their plight on the advantages possessed by members of other 
groups. Of course, different groups clearly did have 
differential access to education, which in turn was the key 
to job mobility . . . . 
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What was the best course of action open to the urban 
migrant who was acutely concerned lest his ethnic group fall 
behind others in the struggle . . .  ? Certainly the rural 
masses had to be informed of the problem. If the masses 
were not aware of their ethnicity, then they would have to 
learn who they really were through the efforts of "ethnic 
missionaries " returning to the homeland. These "missionaries" 
would also have to outline a strategy by which the. ethnic group, 
once fully conscious of its unity and its potential, could compete 
with its rivals. Clearly the competition required enrolling 
more children in school, particularly at the secondary level, 
for the graduates of a good local secondary school would be 61 
assured of rapid . , . mobility within modern society . . . .
In this manner, Abernethy accounts for the formation of ethnic unions 
among the Ibibio, Ibo and Urhobo in Nigeria. 
A similar pattern obtains in the political process, save that 
the stakes are higher. Not only is p�wer itself at stake, but also the 
benefits which power can bring: control over the distribution of modernity 
itself. 
There can be no doubt but that electoral competition arouses 
ethnic conflict. The tensions arising from the 1964 elections in Nigeria 
were one of the precipitates of civil war in that country; over a dozen 
years earlier, ethnically based parties were formed to contest the first 
general eiections in that country. 
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Similarly, the primary instruments 
of the virulent ethnic conflict in the Congo were the numerous political 
parties formed by politicians to contest the i96o national elections. 63 -
Elections, or anticipation of them, has also precipitated ethnic conflict 
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in Zanzibar, Rwanda, and Ghana. Zambia represents another interest-
ing case. As suggested in the sociology of the colonial period in Zambia, 
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there was ar. 2.osence of ethnic conflict which was puzzling when viewed in 
a comparat:.-.-e perspective; indeed, the seeming absence stimulated many 
of the outstanding pieces of research on the phenomenon . . Nonetheless, 
ethnic confiict has emerged in Zambia, and its parantage can be traced 
to electoral :;:>::>litics. The_division between_the Tong� -Ila-Lenje cluster 
and the rest of the country arose with the elections of 1959; and the sub-
sequent splits between the· Lozi and Bemba, and the Nyanja speakers and 
Bemba speakers, clearly date to the intra-UNIP elections of A ugust 1967 
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and the general elections of December 1968.  
Perhaps the main reason for these conflicts i s  that in the 
competition for power, ethnic appeals are useful to politicians. Given 
that most constituencies tend to be dominated by the members of one 
ethnic group--a result of the politics of apportionment and delimitation--
an ethnic appeal is an attractive and efficacious weapon in th·e competition 
for office. Moreover, because ethnic groups contain persons of all 
occupations, socio-economic background, life styles, and positions in 
the life cycle, the appeal of common ethnicity can generate uniiied suppo;t 
where other issues would be divisive. As a result, in the competition 
for power, and for the benefits of modernity and the prestiae it confers 0 ' 
politicians will stimulate the formation of competitively aligned ethnic 
groups. As stated by Sklar: "It is less frequently recognized that 
tribal movements may be created and instigated into action by the new
men of power in furtherance of their own special interests . .
,,66 
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Naturally, this is not to state that the politicians are alone to 
blame for the rise of ethnic conflict. Indeed, while they do instigate 
ethnic conflicts; they often behave like captives of the forces which they 
helped to create. This leads us to the next question with which we plan 
to deal in this paper: Having accounted for the format1·on of ethnic groups, 
how can we explain their persistence ? 
v 
Ethnic groups persist largely becaus: of their capacity to 
extract goods and services from th.e modern sector and thereby satisfy 
the demands of their members for the components of modernity. Insofar 
as they provide these benefits to their m embers, they are able to gain 
their support and achieve their loyalty. 
The capacity of ethnic groups to extract goods and services 
from the modern sector is best demonstrated in their relationship with 
those who have achieved positions of prominence in that sector. Ethnic 
groups exert powerful social pressures upon the modern elite in order 
to satisfy the demands of their members. Perhaps the most persuasive 
evidence for these assertions is the reaction of the modern elite itself. 
Its members experience their positions not only as privileged but also 
as onerous; they feel that they are at the center of tremendous social 
pressures. As Victor Uchendu states: "My town demanded leadership 
from me. But this leadership is a trying as well as a thankless experience. 
26 
67 J.Vfy town has a passionate desire 1 to get up. 1 1 ' Mainza Chona, currently 
Vice-President of the Republic of Zambia, argues the same point: 
modern leaders are subject to concerted pressures and forced to act 
as spokesmen for ethnic interests. Rather than blaming members of the 
national elite for instigating "tribalism, 11 he states, the citizens of 
Zambia should blame the "local leaders in the villages and towns" who 
11travel . . . to Lusaka to meet leaders" in order to urge them to serve 
parochial interests. Chona concludes: 
Unless the local leaders in the villages and towns stop being 
competitive against other groups and begin to regard top 
leaders as national leaders we shall not find a lasting solution 
to [the problem of tribalism]. 68 
The demands upon the modern elite are predictable. Characteristically, 
they contain demands for material resources: financial.contributions 
from the moderns for the construction of new facilities and for the creation 
of educational funds. Some groups even levy taxes upon their more 
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prosperous urban members. The members of ethnic groups also seek 
advice on how to better their incomes. In response, ethnic groups retain 
members of the modern elite as "economic advisers . . ·. to instruct 
their members in the ups and downs of trade; they have also advised in 
favour of joint stock enterprise. Different fields of trade are surveyed 
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and analyzed for the benefit of the members . . . 
11 The demands of 
ethnic groups are also for service: the use of the skills of the moderns, 
be they technical, educational, or political, on behalf of "their people. 11 
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The capacity of ethnic groups to extract goods and services 
from the modern elite derive from several sources. They control the 
allocation of strong inducements. For example, because elite skills 
are a desired commodity, ethnic groups are able to win the use of these 
skills by making their acquisition contingent upon ethnic service. Thus, 
Lloyd reports for the Itsekiri that "several lawyer-politicians who were 
sent to England with community funds are expected on their return to 
repay the debt either in cash . . . or by winning tangible benefits for 
. 71 their people. 11 Other inducements include prestige: syinbols of status 
are conferred or withdrawn by ethnic groups in recognition of services 
performed by the group. Thus, Plotnicov documents the conferral of 
status by ethnic groups in Jos; members of the modern elite, he writes 
have the skills for dealing with government and the wider 
community. Their knowledge in legal and economic matters, 
secretarial and bookkeeping procedures, and their general 
sophistication in modern and urban affairs is indispensible. 
Their value to the ethnic group . . .  [is] recognized through 
the granting of high . . . offices . . .  and sometimes . .  
titles as well, which furthe:r. reinforce the modern elite's 
powers . . . .  "72 
Ethnic groups also possess strong sanctions, most notably the capacity 
to withdraw elite status. This is vividly revealed in the political sector, 
where, for example, in.recent elections the Luo, Sukuma, and Lozi 
turned out of office several of their most renowned political leaders, 
some of cabinet rank. The reported reason for the imposition of these 
sanctions was the elite's -failure· to serve local interests. 7 3  
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Ther e  is  another r eason for the ability of ethnic groups to 
extract goods and services from the incumbents of the modern sector . 
For many moderns , what i s  prestigeful is still d efined in term s  of 
traditional criteria. For many, modernity becom es a r e sourc e  which 
they utilize to attain prestige ·within the traditional sector . 
Evidence for the continue d  presence of traditional notions of 
stratification is contained in the very studies which emphasise the 
preeminence of modern stratification systems. Thus , for example , 
Hicks finds that the standard deviation of the 1·anking of modern occupations 
by Africans is higher than that of the rankings by Europeans;  he attributes 
this in part to the use by Africans of two s ets of stratification criteria , 
one traditional and the other modern. 74 Similarly, Foster found that 
Ghanaians give higher ranks to traditional political office s - -chiefs and 
councillor s - -than they give to many modern occupations "despite the fact 
that often holders of thes e  [offices] had little education and received 
little . . .  pay. Clearly the r espondents in Foster ' s  study were using 
at least two dimensions to rate the full list of occupations ; one being the 
75 
western dim ension arid the other a traditional dimension. 11 
The ac�eptance of traditional stratification patterns leads many 
moderns to convert their success in the modern sector into prestige in 
the traditional order by utilizing their wealth to obtain prestigeful po sitions 
in their ethnic groupings .  rvtany studies cite the purchasing of .traditional
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7 6  titles by the succes sful entrants into the modern s ector . Other s note 
the u s e  of wealth to purcha se traditional offices .  77 Still other s  record the use
of income derived in the modern s ector to practice clientage and to 
finance large -scale traditional ceremonies ,  both of which are conve'ntional 
means of enhancing one 1 s standing in the traditional order. As Balandier 
state s ;  
[a wealthy per son] can make "sociological investments "; in 
this cas e ,  he uses  new economic conditions to achieve or to 
reinforce  a traditional type of p rominence.  The size of his 
·•�clientele" and the extension of. his generosity will reveal 
his degree of success;  his profit will be expre s sed in prestige 
and authority . . .  the economic "game" is still only a method 
to achieve goals determined by the old social and cultural 
system . 78 
The ethnic group s  are thus able to extract goods and s e rvices 
from their m embers in the modern sector . We have already indicated 
how they use this capacity to satisfy the demands of their members for 
the components of modernity: income, education, and urban employment. 
The r esult of this proces s  is the generation of p olitical support. T'nus ,  
a s  Sklar notes ,  the tribally dominated parties of Nigeria seized power 
at the regional level where :  
The r egional party leaders operated highly effective systems 
of patronage , dispensing job s 1  contracts , com_m erical loans , 
, ". . and. scholarships .  Young people in all parts of the 
country were pr essured in various ways to support the regional 
government partie s .  . . .  Opinion follows interest , and many 
young adults furthered their careers by adopting regionalist 
principles  and tribalist ideologies ,  79 
R elated to our point is a last observation: that ethnic groups 
r epre s ent a succe s sful mechanism for generating expanding benefits in 
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the modern era . Vfe hav e r epeatedly allu ded to the various components 
of m o dernity - -income ,  education, and urbanization - -and noted how ethnic 
groups are created a s  pa rt of the proc e s s  of attaining them . What we 
wish to s tr e s s  h e r e  is that many ethnic groups , and in particular tho s e  
that span the rural and urban s ector s ,  combine the s e  components into 
a m utually r ei nforcing syste m - -one that produces expansion and growth 
and th er efor e increasing payoffs . We repre sent this system a s  follow s :  
R ural 
Inco m e  
1 
Education Urban Migration 
t� ________ u_r_
b_a ... l Em,ployment 
School Fees 
Teacher s 
Contributions to R ural Inc ome, R emittanc e s  
Advice o n  Marketing, Trading, Transport, etc. 
Formation of C r e dit Facilitie s  
W e  have a lr ea d y  not e d  the major linkage s in this system . We have a l s o  
noted the manner in which ethnic groups furnish the s e  linka ge s ,  by 
o r ganizing cash c r opping, education, and job placement , and by channeling 
the b enefits of urban employment into the rural s e ctor i n  the form of 
e conomic advi c e ,  r emittanc es , and educational progr am s .  Here we n e e d  
b u t  stre s s  the phenomenon of "positive feedback" that perpetuates this 
system. To empha sise but one kind of evidence for this feedback, we 
m e ntion the studie s  by Caldwell. He not e s  that tho s e  rural famili e s  which 
a r e  wea lthi er tend to g enerate more educat e d s ;  tha t  the e ducat e d s  a r e  more 
prone to migrate; and that they ther efor e obt ain hi gher incom e s .  S O  He
a l s o  not e s  that th e families which c ontribute toward education fee s  get 
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b a c k  mor e m oney from the educate d s  than they contribute d in the fir s t  
plac e .  81 A s  a r e sult, t h e  income o f  t h e  rural familie s  expands e v e n  m o r e
a n d  the cycle continu e s .  A s  w e  have note d ,  i n  s om e  ca s e s ,  ethnic 
o r ganizations e s tabli sh the s e  fe edbacks , and in other ca s e s  they lay hold 
of them and institutionalize the m .  In both ca s e s ,  they have h e lp e d  .to 
o r ganize the c omponents of m o d e rnity into the system of m o d e rnity 
d e s cribed by Lerner and Deutsch. That ethnic groups have devi sed 
o r ganizations which enable them to cope with , and indeed utiliz e and 
benefit from , the pro c e s s  of m o d ernization helps t o  explain why they have 
p r o sper e d  in the modern era. For ins ofar a s  they s e rve the d emonstrate dly 
strong demands of the African peoples for modernization, they can win 
their support and thereby gain a heightened capacity to p e r s i s t .  
VI 
We wish to sugge s t  that the r e  a r e  levels of intensity of ethnic 
competition and that ethnic competition takes place to varying d egr e e s .  In 
the fir st d e g r e e ,  the r e  is non-political competition, .that i s , competition 
for the s c a r c e  benefits created in the modernization proc e s s ,  In the s e cond 
d e gr e e ,  ethnic competition becomes politici's e d ;  not only do groups compete 
for the scarce r e s ourc e s ,  but they als o compete for the c ontrol over the 
allocation of the s e  r e s our c e s .  I n  the third d e gr e e ,  and one w e  have not 
di s cu s s e d up to now , political comp etition intensifi e s  to the level of c onflict; 
at thi s level, c o e r cion and vi olence a r e  introduced into ethnic r elations . 
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I n  this s e c tion, w e  s e ek t o  s ugg e s t  the facto r s  that irtfluer.ce the inte nsity 
of e thnic competitio n. 
The Emergence of Ethnic Compe tition 
The arena of the c.ompetitio n for modernity is mo s t  often the urban 
center; but not all towns in Africa are s imilar in thei r  s.tructur e ,  and the.ir 
differing s tructure s appear to influe n c e  the probability with which the 
competition for modernity transforms into ethnic comp e tition. Several 
maj o r  facto r s  appear to promote thi s transformation. These include: 
1. The d e g r e e  to which the town is numerically dominated by . 
a single maj or ethnic group. Characteristically, numerical dominance 
l ea d s  the m o dern elites of minority groups t o  form ethnic or ganizations 
a s  a m eans for protecting and a dvancing their position in the m odern urban 
s ector. 
2. The degree to which the maj ority group dominate s the town politically. 
Ins ofar as the town is governed by the traditional political institutions of 
the major ethnic group , the elites of the minority ethnic group feel even 
lnore thr eatened' in the competition for modernity, and therefo r e  
s eek t o  form e thnic groups t o  prote ct and promote their interests i n  the 
m od ern s e c tor, 
3 .  The d eg r e e  of ethnic s e gr egation in the city. Insofar a s  hous ing 
policies promote the spatial c lustering of persons of similar ethnic bac k -
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g r oun d ,  t h e y  will t e n d  t o  form ethnic organizations . 
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4 .  The d e g r e e  t o  which urban land tenure is r e gulated b y  c u s tomary 
law. ·when it is so r e gula t e d ,  the c ompetition for land b ecome s a comp etition 
for a s car c e  r e sour c e  who s e  allocation is governed by ethnic criteria . By 
contra s t ,  a s  in c entral Africa , when urban land is lea s ehold, ethnic group 
m embe r ship is.  largely irr elevant in the allocation of thi s increasingly 
valuable c ommodity. The allocation of urban land by customary law thus 
promoted the formation of ethnic gr oupings . .  
A s e c o nd s e t  of facto r s  influences the likelihood of the formation 
of e thnic group s  under conditions of_ comp e tition for the be nefits o f  mod e r nity;
these factor s are a s s ociated with the nature of urban- r ural relatio ns. As 
w e  have emphasized, e thnic groups appear to emerge when they can o rganize 
and p romo te a patte r n  of mutually reinforcing inte ractions betw e e n  the city 
and the countrys ide. Several facto r s  facilitate the emergence of this patte r n .  
1. . It take s at le a s t  a mo dicum o f  surplus i n come t o  finance the 
expor t and education o f  manpower; and without the urban, educated mod e r n s ,  
e thnic groups d o  n o t  eme r g e . Thus it is that rural cash cropping s oci e t i e s  
appear to b e  the o n e s  which mo s t  often form e thnic g rouping s .  
2 .  S e c ondly , fragmentary evidenc e suggests that the or ganization 
of lab or in the r ural s ociety is also important. Whe r e  the or ganization o f  
labor i s  s u c h  tha t the lo s s  of rural manpower lea d s  to a n e t  d e c r eas e in 
rural incom e - - that i s ,  a decrea s e  in the quantity of marketable prod u c e ,  
and th us o f  r evenues ,  that exc e e d s  the revenues cr eated by re mittanc e s  
from the urban s ector - - then the .cycling r elationship between urban 
immi gration and rural income fails to materialize . 8 3 A s  w e  have indicate d ,
this r e lationship i s  e s s ential to the generation of expanding moder n  benefits
and th e s e  expanding b enefits are the s ource of support of ethnic orga nization s .  
3 ,  Thirdly, and by a similar ar gum ent, the s evere overcrowding 
o f  land app e a r s  to promote the " cycling" r elationship b e tween the urban 
and rural s ecto r s .  Under conditions o f  overcrowdin g ,  the mar ginal product
of the rural worker app r oach e s  z er o .  To relea s e  the worker t o  the urban 
a r ea i s  the r efor e alm o s t  a s su r e dly to s e cur e a net inc r e a s e  in income which 
can then be organize d  in the manner outlined above. Thus it i s  that rural 
groups with high population densiti e s ,  like the Ibo and Kikuyu , which appear 
t o  be peculiarly prone t o  the fo rmation of ethnic groupings . 
4. Mor e ov�r .  the rural countryside must be sufficiently prosperous
to attract moderns back to it. Generally, where e thnic or ganization for m ,  
they d o  s o  in rural s oc ieties characteriz e d  b y  the p r e s ence of .young educate d s ;
ind e e d ,  the s e  p er s ons often form the local cad r e s  o f  the ethnic groups i n  
the countryside , 84 But, unle s s  the countryside i s  relatively prosperous, the s e
p e r sons will not r e s i d e  the r e ,  and ethnic groups will not form . 
5 .  A last factor appears t o  b e  crucial: the maintenanc e of 
r e latively d e n s e  family networks b etw e en the city and the countrysi d e . · W e  
have not e d  that the str ength o f  ethni c obligations exp e r ienced by urban 
r e s idents is a function of the ma gnitude of the kinship p r e s sures to which 
they are exp o s e d .  A d ete rminate o f  this magnitude i s  the numbe r  o f  kin 
in their urban environment. Whe r e  a rural s ociety t e nd s  to dispe r s e  its 
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m embers amo::g 2. v:ide range of cities , a s  opp o s e d  to concentrating them 
into a fev; rnaj sc.  : :.>v.'ns , th en the s e n s e  of ethnic obligation is le s s  lik ely to 
emerge.  Thu s , ic:r example, Har ries -Jones has noted the r elative dispersion 
of clo s e  family r e lations of Zambian ethnic groups throughout the s everal 
copperbelt towns , and ,  contra s ting this to patterns elsewhe r e  in Afri c a ,  
ha s r elate d  the phenom enon to the failure o f  or ganiz e d  ethnic groups to
emerge in Z aP-ibian urban s ocieti e s .  8 5 
The Politicization of Ethnic Competition 
S everal factor s appear to be crucial in politicizing ethnic compe tition, 
and thus in obtaining the s e cond level' of intensity in ethnic compe tition. 
1. T'ne fir s t  and most obvious factor is the d eg r e e  of comp etition 
allowed in the political s ector . It is pr ecis ely becau s e  the indep end ent state s 
of Africa, in c ontr a s t  to the colonial bureacraci e s ,  made p r ovision for 
competititive politic s that ethnic competiti.on could be c om e  p oliti cize d  in. 
the p o s t - c o lonia l era . Moreover , it would appear pr obable that with the 
r e strictions on political competition impos e d  by no -party, military r e gim e s , 
ethnic compet!tion will again become d epoliticized ; q.nd" we would then 
predict that it will be le s s  intens e than in the era of rival politician s , 
competing partie s ,  and contested elections in Afri ca. 
2. A s e c on d  factor affecting the degree of politicization of ethnic 
c omp etition is the magnitude of the r evenues which the government disper s e s  
for development purpos e s .  Insofar a s  the government is rich , the s take s 
fo r controlling it are high, and the ince ntive to s e i z e  power is the r e fo r e  
s trong. As a r e s ult, political competition b e tw e e n  ethnic groups will 
i n c i·eas e .  lVfo r eover, ins ofar a s  the government allo cate s  revenue s fo r 
development purpo s e s ,  the o c casions for c o nfl i c t  increa s e :  locatio nal 
dispute s concerning the citing of plants, roads, and proj e c t s ,  f o r  example, 
multiply. Thus, for example, it is no t surpris ing that a p r imar y  i n c e n tive 
for the e me rg e n c e  o f  e thnic conflic t  in p reviously tranquil Zambia w a s  the 
sudden expansion o f  public revenues and the r e s ultant g r o w th of disput e s  
o v e r  this allo catio n .  With independence and the breakup of the Federation
o f  Rhod e s ia and Nyas aland, the public r evenues available to the gove r nment 
o f  Zambia expanded e no r mously; and debates c o nc e r ning the dis tributi o n  of
the s e  revenues led to a maj o r  split betw e e n  the political leaders of the 
Bemba speake r s  and the lead e r s  of other trib e s .  I n  the e y e s  o f  s o me ,  the 
B emba had s e eme d to be prospe ring unduly from the patterns of public 
·exp e nditur e .
3 . A third maj or factor influe ncing the politicization of e thnic 
c o nflict would a·ppear t o  be the capaci t y of traditio nal political ins titutio n s  
to utilize mode r n  r e s our c e s  and the r eby p e r p e tuate their political rol e s  i n  
the mode r n  e ra .  A n  examination of this phenomenon would r equire at l e a s t  
k d l f .  h 1 b . 86 a boo , an indeed at e a s t  two ine ones ave r ecent y een writte n. 
'Ve can the r efo r e  but mention this factor and emphasize its impor tance . 
C o mpe tition to C o nflic t  
The la s t  major task i s  t o  specify the fa c to r s  w hi c h  tra n s fo r m  
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political com?etition into political conflict. SeveTal crucial one s emerge 
from the cas e s  we have considered. 
1. The fir s t  i s  the quantity of mod e r n  re sour c e s  that are 
available to be dis tributed among the compe ting ethnic g roup s .  Thu s ,  for 
example, the Council for Inte r - Societal Studie s  of Nor thwe s te r n  Univer sity, 
i n  a maj o r  quantitative s tudy, report a negative correlation between levels 
f d . . d 1 . b " l '  . Af . 87 h f o mo e r m.z a tion an communa 1ns ta l ity in r1ca. T e i r  measure o 
c ommunal ins tability is the frequen c y  of acts of coercio n  and viol e nc e :  
civil war s ,  communal rebellions,  and i r r edentism. w· e  regard the se 
findings a s  sugge s ting that mo r e· modern societi e s  can fo re s tall e thnic 
conflic t, o r  alter natively, be tter accommodate ethni c comp e tition. An 
obvious explanation for this i s  that the more mode r n  s tates of Africa are the 
o n e s  which have succe s s fully g e ne rated a lar g e  quantity of be nefits to be
di s tributed among the rival claimants for the goods of the modern era. 
2 . The s e co nd maj o r  factor i s  the intens i ty of political competition
among e thnic group s .  Our a s sumption i s  that political conflict becomes mo.re 
p robable the g r eater the i ntensity of political c ompetition. The intensi ty 
of political comp e tition among e thnic g roups depends on the s tr ength 
of the e thnic appeals made by r ival politician s ;  the s t r ength ·of the s e  
app eal s ,  i n  turn, is a func ti o n  o f  the relative size of the politicians ' 
e thni c g roup s .  W e  can rep r e s ent a single politician ' s  behavior i n  the 
follo wing way. W e  define an e thnic appeal a s  involving (1) the slandering 
of other e thnic g roups and (2) s o lici ting the s uppo rt o f  one ' s  o w n .  W e  
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a·s s ume a n  electoral system with a majority vote d e ter mining the outcome
of the e l e c tion, and .the pre s e nce of only two par ties p e r  electoral di s trict.
Two considerations a r e  involv ed in devising an ethnic app eal: 
The need to win the support of other ethnic groups and the need to consolidate 
the support of one ' s  own group. For a politician, both c ons id erations a r e  
a function o f  t h e  r e lative size of his own group. we can r epr e s ent the s e
considerations a s  curv e s .  
Th e  utility of appealing to other groups starts high ; when the 
p olitician' s  own group is r el.:;i.tively small, he ha s no choice but to appeal 
for vot e s  outside it. The utility r emains high, for as the politican ' s  own 
group approaches 51% of the constitu ency, th e value o f  every vote in the 
constituency inc r ea s e s .  Howeve r ,  once the politican' s own group can 
ensur e his election, he need but appeal to hi s own gr oup and he can make 
such an appeal by attacking other group s .  The curve therefor e falls 
dir ectly to z er o .  
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The ne c e s sity of appealing to one ' s  own group i s  never abs ent; and,  
intuitively, the utility o f  such an appeal would appear to b e  a dir e c t  function 
of the relative s i z e  of th e group. The utility would naturally peak a t  th e 5 1% 
mark , and then d e cline. The reason for the decline i s  that a s  the group 
approaches the total population of the constituency , appeals to se ctions 
of the group may b ec ome mor e u s eful in winning th e c onstituency .  
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Combining the two curves yields the following composite curve, 
r ep r e s enting the pr e dicted strength of a politican' s ethnic appeals a s . a  
function o f  the r elative siz e o f  his group. \Ve a d d  ten to all s c or e s  so a s  
t o  avoid having ne gative s c or e s  when the candidate i s  appealing both to 
his own g roup and t o  oth er s .  
Str ength of Hi 20 
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Mad e  by a 
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By this r ea s oning, and a s suming that ethnic conflict i s  most p r obable 
when ethnic political competition is the most inten s e ,  we would p r edict that 
ethnic conflict ; under the political rule s s p e c ified at the outs e t, is mos t  likel y  
where any o n e  group. cons titute � around 5 0 %  o f  the member s hip of the political unit. 
3. The third major factor is the degr e e  of ethnic stratification 
in the society. Where any given ethnic gr oup is ensconced in an elite 
political position, other things being equal, then the. greater th e p robability 
that political competition among ethnic groups .will lead to political violenc e .  
Much work ne e d s  t o  b e  done o n  this proposition, but I would nonethe le s s  
a s s ert that the greater the d e gree t o  which ethnic political competition 
involves political r e s tratificiation, the greater the likelihood of ethnic 
4 2  
comp etition intens ifying into violenc e .  
VII 
We have ar gued that ethnic competition i s  r e lated to m o dernization 
in Africa and that c e r tain basic factprs ensur e thi s r elationshi p .  1,Ve have 
a l s o  argued that , in c e r tain s ituations ,  ethnic g r oup s  can p e r s i s t  and 
p r o sper in the modern era.  Lastly, w e  have suggested that the r e  are 
d e gr e e s  of ethnic competition, running from the ab s enc e of such competition 
to political violenc e ,  and we have indicated the facto r s  that appear to 
influence th e level of intensity that will be attained .  In conclu s ion, what
we have done is to suggest a way of looking at ethnic behavio r  that empha s i z e s  
that it i s  d ynamic a n d  r ational behavior; that it r ep r e s ents an attempt t o  d ea l  
with, organi z e ,  and b enefit from t h e  mod ernization of societie s ;  and that 
it can change a:r;i.d alter in intensity when s ubj ect to the influ enc e of c er tain 
fa ctor s .  W e  r ealize that our a r gum ent is but a be ginnin g of_ an und e r s tanding 
of the phenomenon, and not an explanation of it. If, however ,  we have 
m a d e  the phenomenon amenable to theorizing, and am enable t o  the 
d evelopment of the ories applicable in Africa , the United State s ,  and 
els ewhe r e ,  then the paper will have s e rved the purp o s e  we intended. 
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